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THE realization has grown among thoughtful people that our very survival
in this age may rest on the capacity of the nation's chief executive to make
swift and unquestioned decisions in an emergency. As a result, a major con-
stitutional problem, previously glossed over, has been brought to the fore.
The problem is that posed by temporary presidential inability to discharge
the powers and duties of the presidency at a time when emergency action is
required. It has been emphasized during the Eisenhower administration by
the President's three periods of temporary physical incapacity, even though,
fortunately, no crisis required immediate presidential action during those
periods. Now that the issue is so forcefully upon us, with our future exist-
ence possibly depending on the forethought that we exercise in resolving it,
failure to take proper steps to answer promptly the constitutional question
would be the height of irresponsibility.
Many people who have considered this problem have assumed that its most
important aspect is the factual determination of presidential inability. But, as
the history of a hundred and seventy years-including that of the six years
immediately past-shows, no real difficulty attends the determination of when
or whether a President is unable to perform the duties of his office. The dis-
ability of Garfield in a coma, or of Wilson during at least part of the time
after his stroke, was undisputed. No factual doubts about President Eisen-
hower's physical condition were of significance during any of his three ill-
nesses. The crux of the constitutional problem has been-and will be-to
ensure that the Vice President can take over with unquestioned authority for
a temporary period when the President's inability is not disputed, and that
the President can resume office once he has recovered.
THE ORIGIN OF THE PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION
Students of the Constitution have differed for many years over the mean-
ing of paragraph 6 of section 1, article II, of the Constitution. This para-
graph, which deals with presidential inability, reads in part: "In case of the
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Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or In-
ability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall
devolve on the Vice President . . ." Although it is this provision which
primarily raises the constitutional problem here under consideration, the lan-
guage quoted does not constitute all of paragraph 6. Immediately following
the quoted words and, significantly, separated only by a comma, is the follow-
ing clause: ". . . and the Congress may by law provide for the case of Re-
moval, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice Presi-
dent, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall
act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected." The clause delineating congressional power has been implemented
from time to time through the enactment of statutes setting forth the suc-
cession to the office of President in the event of the removal, death, resigna-
tion or inability of both the President and Vice President. Some independent
problems of constitutional interpretation have been raised by this clause; but
these problems are extraneous to this Article.
An initial examination of the first clause poses several questions. The clause
outlines four situations in which the Vice President may be required to act
in some capacity. Three of the situations, namely, removal from office, death,
or resignation, apparently contemplate the permanent exclusion of the Presi-
dent for the balance of his term. But was it intended that "Inability to dis-
charge the Powers and Duties of the said Office" should exclude the President
thenceforth, in the event of his recovery, from discharging those powers and
duties? Another obvious question arises from the language of the clause which
provides "the same shall devolve on the Vice President." To what do the
words "the same" refer? What is it that "devolves" on the Vice President?
Is it the office of President, in which case the President might thenceforth be
excluded as in the other three instances of permanent exclusion; or do only
the powers and duties devolve on the Vice President, in which case his tenure
as the acting chief executive may very well be for only a temporary period?
Historical investigation discloses that the iwo main clauses of paragraph 6
were not originally created by the Constitutional Convention as part of the
same paragraph. They were considered separately, approved in substance on
different days and, in fact, drafted by different bodies. The first clause was
composed by the Committee of Detail and by the Committee of Eleven and
reported to the full Convention on September 4th: the second clause was
offered as a motion from the floor on September 7, 1787. Indeed, the two
clauses were not worded as they now appear when they were approved as to
substance by the full Convention and referred to the Committee of Style.
The Committee of Style had no power to make any change in meaning or
substance, but only to edit the text for stylistic improvement.,
The true meaning of the first clause of paragraph 6 becomes apparent when
the original articles, as agreed to by the Convention in substance, are set in
1. Davis, Inability of the President, S. Doc. No. 308, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 10, 11 (1918).
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juxtaposition to the articles as they were reported by the Committee of Style
and (with one change) as they now appear in our Constitution.
Articles Originally Agreed to by the
Convention
Article X, section 2: ... and in case
of his removal as aforesaid, death,
absence, resignation or inability to
discharge the powers or duties of
his office the Vice President shall
exercise those powers and duties
until another President be chosen,
or until the inability of the Presi-
dent be removed.
Article X, section 1: The Legisla-
ture may declare by law what officer
of the United States shall act as
President in case of the death, resig-
nation, or disability of the President
and Vice President;
and such Officer shall act according-
ly, until such disability be removed,
or a President shall be elected.
2
As Later Reported by Committee of
Style and Finally Adopted
Article II, section 1, paragraph 6:
In case of the removal of the presi-
dent from office, or of his death,
resignation, or inability to discharge
the powers and duties of the said
office, the same shall devolve on the
vice-president,
and the Congress may by law pro-
vide for the case of removal, death,
resignation or inability, both of the
president and vice-president, declar-
ing what officer shall then act as
president,
and such officer shall act according-
ly. until the disability be removed,
or a president shall be elected.
3
Three important points appear by visual comparison of the two texts above.
First, the articles as initially adopted by the Convention used the words "the
Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties." One does not exer-
cise an office, but one does exercise powers and duties. Clearly, then, the
clause providing that "the same shall devolve on the Vice President" means
that the Vice President shall exercise the powers and duties of the office, and
not that the Vice President succeeds to the office itself. In other words, he
acts as President, but he remains in the office of Vice President. This inter-
pretation is borne out by the history of the Convention, which shows that the
vice presidency was originally created to provide for an alternate chief ex-
ecutive who might function from time to time should the President be unable
to exercise the powers and duties of his office. Only after creating this stand-
by role did the Convention consider giving the Vice President something to
do while he waited to act as President. The idea of assigning him the duty
of presiding over the Senate was strictly an afterthought.
4
Secondly, and of considerable significance, the articles as initially agreed
to by the Convention definitely prescribed the period during which the Vice
President was to act as President, that is, "until another President be chosen,
2. 2 FARRAND, REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 495, 499, 532 (1911);
Davis, supra note 1, at 11.
3. 2 FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 598-99, 626.
4. Davis, supra note 1, at 12-13; WILLIAMs, THE AmERIcAN VIcE-PRESIDENCY: NEW
LooK 1-2 (1954).
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or until the inability of the President be removed." This makes crystal clear
that the exercise of the powers and duties of the presidential office by the
Vice President was to be for a temporary period only.
A third point should be observed. Each of the clauses which are now
joined originally contained separate but similar language limiting the tenure
of whoever was to exercise the power and duties of the presidential office.
The words of the first clause have already been noted; the second clause
provided: "and such Officer shall act accordingly, until such disability be re-
moved, or a President shall be elected." When these two clauses were referred
to the Committee of Style, the text was revised. The clauses were consoli-
dated in one sentence, separated only by commas, and for terseness one of the
phrases limiting the tenure of the person exercising the powers and duties of
the presidential office was eliminated. The phrase at the end of the revised
sentence was intended to refer to all of the situations described in that sen-
tence. 5
Still further proof of the original intention to have the Vice President as-
sume only the duties of the President, not his office, can be inferred from the
Convention's reaction to the version of paragraph 6 proposed by the Com-
mittee of Style. The only change made by the Convention in the Commit-
tee's draft was to strike the concluding words "or the period for chusing an-
other president arrive," and to substitute the phrase as it now appears, "or
a President shall be elected." This step was taken at Madison's insistence
and in conformity with a motion previously adopted for the specific purpose
of allowing the vacancy to be filled by a special presidential election.0 Of
course, the Convention's action does not necessarily amount to a clear-cut
decision concerning the status of the Vice President while he should act as
President, but it certainly suggests that, in the contemplation of the framers,
the only occupant of the presidential office was to be the elected President
himself-that if he left the office, a vacancy would exist requiring the elec-
tion of a replacement.
7
One may logically ask why doubt and controversy over the meaning of this
clause has arisen in the past, if the framers' intent is so clear and certain.
The answer is simply that a great deal more is now known about what went
on at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 than was known in the past, even
in the years immediately after the Convention. It was conducted in secrecy,
and not until Madison's notes were published posthumously in 1840 8 was a
fair picture available, although still not a complete one. Farrand's work,
5. Silva, Presidential Inability, 35 U. DET. L.J. 139, 148-50 (1957) ; SILVA, PRESIDEN-
TIAL SUCCESSION 4-13 (1951).
6. Davis, supra note 1, at 10; Silva, Presidential Inability, 35 U. DET. L.J. 139, 150
(1957).
7. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCcESSION 10 (1951).
8. THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (1840). These papers, consisting of Madison's
reports of the debates in the Constitutional Convention, were purchased from Mrs. Madison
in 1837 by the United States Government, and published three years later.
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Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, the definitive source on the sub-
ject, did not appear until 1911. Other important data has come to light sub-
sequently through the research of biographers and historians dealing with
persons and actions of the time. Understandably, it has taken years for
scholars to bring the information together. Furthermore, confusing precedents
have been established by officials who did not have access to this information.
HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE ON
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
It was not until 1841 that paragraph 6 of section 1, article II, became of
practical importance. William Henry Harrison was the first President to die
in office, and this event made John Tyler President. Or did it? As a matter
of history, the first papers submitted to John Tyler for his signature had,
below the space for his signature, the words "Acting President." Tyler was
incensed; by a stroke of his pen he eliminated the word "Acting," and signed
as President." And so, President he did become. After him, six other Vice
Presidents did likewise upon the death of the President in office.' 0 Few now
quarrel with this constitutional fait accompli, or want it changed. But it was
to cause trouble later on when the constitutional question arose not from the
death of a President, but from his inability.
Zachary Taylor died and was succeeded as President by Millard Fillmore:
Abraham Lincoln died and was succeeded as President by Andrew Johnson;
then James Garfield was shot in 1881. He lay in a coma for eighty days,
completely unable to perform any of the duties of the presidency.'1 All were
aware of his condition, and few disputed its seriousness. After sixty days, a
cabinet meeting was held in which it was unanimously voted, seven to noth-
ing, that Chester A. Arthur, Vice President, should assume the powers of
the presidential office. But was he to become President? Opinion was divided.
The Cabinet itself voted four to three, with Attorney General Wayne Mac-
Veagh among the majority, that Arthur would become President and would
thereby oust Garfield from office.' 2 The three previous occasions on which
the Vice President had become President upon the death of the existing chief
executive were powerfully persuasive precedents because, after all, the lan-
guage of the Constitution concerning death or inability was exactly the same;
indeed, as the preceding analysis shows, the position of the Vice President,
whether the President died or was disabled, was actually intended by the
framers to be the same.
The Cabinet resolved, nevertheless, that before Arthur should take this
momentous step, Garfield should be advised and consulted about the conse-
quences which might attend Arthur's assumption of the powers of the Presi-
9. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 14 (1951).
10. Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Coolidge and Truman.
11. Silva, Presidential Inability, 35 U. Din. L.J. 139, 140-41 (1957).
12. Ibid.
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dent. Garfield's physician, however, gave his medical opinion that such con-
sultation might very well kill the President. Arthur himself emphatically de-
clined to take any steps whatsoever to assume the powers of the President.
He would not be a party to ousting Garfield from office. His reluctance on
this score may well have been augmented by the fact that he belonged to the
opposite wing of the Republican party from Garfield's, and that Garfield's
assassin, Guiteau, enthusiastically proclaimed both his admiration for Arthur
and his loyalty to the political principles of Arthur's "stalwart" faction of
the party.13
Garfield lingered for another twenty days, then died; and Arthur there-
upon took office as President. But the eighty-day interim period had had a
harmful effect on the country. Regular government business could not be
conducted, because of the President's lengthy absence, and also because sub-
ordinate officials could not be appointed. The nation's foreign relations, lack-
ing the direction of a chief executive, seriously deteriorated. 14 Furthermore,
general uncertainty and political antagonisms were engendered by the fact
that the dying President belonged to one wing of the party and Arthur to
another.
The second case of presidential inability occurred in 1919, less than forty
years after Garfield's death, when WVoodrow Wilson suffered a stroke while
leading the fight for the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
After unprecedented military and economic exertions in World War I,
America had reached a new pinnacle in world leadership; and at that precise
moment its leader was stricken. Vice President Marshall was in the wings as
an understudy, but there he stayed. A great Senate battle over ratification of
the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations was waged,
with presidential leadership missing. Marshall flatly declined to assume any
of the powers of the presidency because of the constitutional uncertainty as
to whether Wilson could resume his office when he recovered.15
The exact extent of Wilson's inability is not clear, but it is certain that for
a period of weeks he was completely unable to perform any of the duties of
the office. Precise information about his condition was carefully shielded from
public view by his wife, his personal physician, and his personal entourage in
the White House. 6 The President's personal advisers obviously feared the
very thing that made Vice President Marshall hesitant to act-if the full ex-
tent of Wilson's disability should become known, public opinion would de-
mand that Marshall exercise the powers of the presidency, and Wilson might
face a constitutional fight to regain his office, should he recover.' 7
13. Id. at 141.
14. Id. at 140; see HOWE, CHESTER A. ARTHUR 153, 181 (1934).
15. WILLIAAS, THE RISE OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY 113-14 (1956) ; Silva, Presidential
Inability, 35 U. DET. L.J. 139, 146 (1957).
16. WAUGH, SECOND CONSUL 125-26 (1956) ; 2 HOUSTON, EIGHT YEAs WITH WIL-
SON'S CABINET 36-37 (1926) ; Kerney, Government by Proxy, 111 CENTURY 481,482 (1926).
17. WAUGH, SECOND CONSUL 127 (1956).
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The jealousy with which the presidential prerogatives were guarded-and
perhaps might again be guarded-is epitomized by the actions of Wilson and
his personal staff from his collapse on September 25, 1919, until the end of
his term on March 4, 1921. Without the direction of the President or Vice
President, Secretary of State Lansing called twenty-one Cabinet meetings.
Having heard of these meetings, Wilson accused Lansing of usurping presi-
dential power and forced him to resign.' 8 Upon Lansing's suggestion that the
Cabinet request Vice President Marshall to act as President, Joseph P.
Tumulty, Wilson's secretary, replied: "You may rest assured that while
Woodrow Wilson is lying in the White House on the broad of his back I
will not be a party to ousting him."' 9 The President himself is reported to
have commented in a similar vein, and to have confided to his secretary, after
Lansing resigned, "Tumulty, it is never the wrong time to spike disloyalty.
When Lansing sought to oust me, I was upon my back. I am on my feet now
and I will not have disloyalty about me."'20 Thus, Lansing's endeavors to
ensure the normal functioning of the executive branch, either by the Vice
President acting as President or by the Secretary of State calling Cabinet
meetings at which executive business could be transacted, were viewed by the
President and his personal staff with antagonism, rather than gratitude.
The pernicious result of the belief that a Vice President actually becomes
President for the balance of the presidential term when called upon to exer-
cise the powers and duties of the presidency, has been to nullify the intent
of the drafters of the Constitution that the nation have an alternate chief
executive to provide continuous executive leadership. It should be apparent
that the original constitutional intent and the problem of providing for the
exercise of presidential power in cases of inability would not be met merely
by providing a new mechanism to determine the existence of the inability.
No such determination was needed in the Garfield and Wilson cases; the in-
ability was patent. The problem was to assure the President, his personal
advisers, the Vice President and the public that the President would not be
ousted from his office by a vice-presidential execution of the powers and
duties of the presidency-to make certain that the President could "come
back" of his own volition. Until this assurance can be given, a President and
his personal entourage may be tempted to conceal or block an attempt to
determine the existence of disability. Moreover, if every presidential retire-
ment from power must be a permanent one, a President's illness-however
serious-will have deep political significance activating diverse political cur-
rents. But if the reins can be relinquished only temporarily, as the original
framers intended, they can be yielded with more grace and, as history shows,
an elaborate mechanism to determine when they should be yielded is un-
necessary.
18. Ibid.
19. TuiuLTy, WOODROW W.SOX A S I KNOW Him 443-44 (1921).
20. Id. at 445.
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PRESIDENT EISENIHOWER'S ILLNESS AND His PROPOSAL FOR A CONSTITTj-
TIONAL AMENDMENT
Immediately after President Eisenhower's heart attack in September 1955,
the President's medical advisers informally and orally gave their opinions as
to the President's condition and the probable duration and extent of his
physical impairment. A survey was made regarding the magnitude and im-
mediacy of the problems that would require presidential action then or in the
near future. Congress was not in session and no international emergencies
impended. Based upon the medical opinions and the survey, the Attorney
General orally advised the Cabinet and the Vice President, who regularly sat
with the Cabinet, that no present situation required the Vice President to
take action under article II, section 1, of the Constitution. This opinion was
accepted by all concerned and attention was then given to developing a inodus
operandi for the functioning of the executive branch during the continuance
of the President's illness. This plan included a decision to have Vice Presi-
dent Nixon preside at meetings of the Cabinet and National Security Council
during the President's absence.
On October 21, 1955, the Attorney General conferred with the President
in his hospital room at Denver to advise him of the legal basis for the fore-
going actions, and to reassure him that no written authorizations were re-
quired from him at that time to ensure that the Government's activities were
carried on according to his previously established policies.
In January 1956, upon President Eisenhower's return to Washington, he
directed the Department of Justice to institute a full legal study of the prob-
lems raised by temporary presidential inability. His purpose was to draft a
plan to protect the country fully if a President were to become disabled at a
time when immediate executive action was needed. Later, it was decided not
to formulate such a plan during the presidential campaign, lest it become en-
tangled in partisan politics. Early in January 1957, the President reviewed
several alternative plans and authorized the Attorney General to consult
persons outside the Government to obtain their views and criticisms. The
opinions of members of the Cabinet were sought at a Cabinet meeting. Final-
ly, a definitive plan which proposed a constitutional amendment was approved
by the President. It was to be sent to Congress with a special message from
the President urging its adoption. But when the plan, in final form, was oral-
ly presented at a meeting of the congressional leaders of both parties, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives raised the point that if the President
should send a special message to Congress urging adoption of the proposed
constitutional amendment, the people of the country, in* the mistaken belief
that some" uhannounced development in the President's condition had oc-
curred, might become alarmed. Accordingly, the forthcoming special message
was cancelled, and public announcement of the plan took the form of testi-
mony by the Attorney General before a subcommittee of the judiciary Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives. 2'
21. Hearings Before a Special Subcommittee on the Study of Presidential Inability
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-35 (1957).
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The operative clauses of the proposed constitutional amendment were as
follows:
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President for the
unexpired portion of the then current term.
Section 2. If the President shall declare in writing that he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties
shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
Section 3. If the President does not so declare, the Vice President, if
satisfied of the President's inability, and upon approval in writing of a
majority of the heads of executive departments who are members of the
President's Cabinet, shall discharge the powers and duties of the office
as Acting President.
Section 4. Whenever the President declares in writing that his inability
is terminated, the President shall forthwith discharge the powers and
duties of his office.
The plan's major purpose was to make abundantly clear that, in the event
of a President's inability, the Vice President would serve only as acting
President and, then, only during the continuation of the presidential inability.
The President was to have the express power to resume the exercise of his
office as soon as he declared that he was again able to act. Also significant,
however, were those provisions outlining a method for determining when
these shifts in function were to occur. Thus, the plan envisaged that, through
voluntarily declaring in writing that he was unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the President himself would initiate the Vice Presi-
dent's tenure as acting President for the period of inability. Similarly, when-
ever the President should declare in writing that his inability was terminated,
he would thereupon resume the powers and duties of his office. This pro-
vision for voluntary action by the President would, in the light of history,
probably cover most cases of presidential inability. In the less common situa-
tion where a President was unable or unwilling to declare his inability, the
constitutional amendment proposed a shift in the responsibility for such a
determination. The Vice President, if satisfied of the President's inability, and
upon the written approval of a majority of the Cabinet, would become act-
ing President for the period of the inability. In this situation also, the Presi-
dent would be entitled at any time to state in writing that his inability was
terminated and thereupon to resume the powers and duties of the presidency.
The proposed constitutional amendment, it should be noted, made no ex-
press provision for a case in which the President would endeavor to take up
the powers and duties of his office although he was clearly unable to do so.
The situation envisages a disagreement between the President and Vice Presi-
dent regarding the President's disability. It was explained, in presenting the
proposed constitutional amendment to Congress, that if such an unlikely situa-
19581
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tion developed, the existing constitutional provisions for impeachment could
be relied upon to settle the disagreement.
Noteworthy also is the fact that section 1 of the proposed constitutional
amendment expressly confirmed the present generally accepted interpretation
of the Constitution-that in case of removal of the President from office or
his death or resignation, the Vice President actually becomes President for
the unexpired portion of the current term. Thus, the precedent set seven times
in cases of death of the President would be expressly adopted in the Con-
stitution itself.
The Eisenhower Plan's Rejection of a "Presidential Inability Commission"
President Eisenhower's proposal rejected any idea of establishing some sort
of inability commission or ad hoc body to determine the fact of presidential
inability. One of the alternative plans first submitted to the President for his
review had provided for such a commission.
Arguments for a group determination of presidential inability overlook the
fact that throughout American history, not merely in the Garfield and Wilson
instances, the problem has never been ascertaining presidential inability; the
stalemate in executive activity has proceeded from a Vice President's reluc-
tance to assume his superior's office and a President's (or his personal ad-
visers') reluctance to turn over presidential duties with no assurance of their
return.
Not only would such a fact-finding commission have been unnecessary and
ineffective in every presidential inability problem so far encountered, but in
the future it could have very serious and unfortunate consequences. Any law
requiring complicated procedures, investigations, hearings, findings, and votes,
would prevent immediate action in case of emergency. Today's need is for
unquestioned continuity of executive power and leadership. A law establish-
ing a fact-finding body on this issue might completely thwart that objective,
to the nation's deadly peril.
Furthermore, it seems unwise to establish elaborate legal machinery to pro-
vide for examinations of the President. The question of the physical and
mental capacity one needs to serve as President is, of course, far more than
a matter of medical findings by a group of learned physicians. Providing for
physical and mental examinations would, at the least, be an affront to the
President's personal dignity and degrade the presidential office itself; more
dangerously, it would give a hostile group power to harass the President for
political purposes.
Aside from these objections to commission-type determination of presiden-
tial inability, grave difficulties would attend arriving at a satisfactory com-
position for such a group. Many earnest people have suggested that the pres-
tige and impartiality of members of the Supreme Court be enlisted to head
or to staff an inability commission, but the letter of Chief Justice Warren of
January 1958 would seem to have removed-and wisely so-all possibility
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of the Justices' participation in such a group.22 Various officers of legal and
medical societies have also been suggested for membership. Since they are
not publicly elected officials and have no public responsibility, however, a
better plan would be to ask these worthy persons to serve, if at all, in an
advisory capacity.
If the power of initial determination is diverted from the executive branch,
or even is shared in some fashion with those outside the executive, a way is
opened for harassment of a President for political motives. A major shift in
the checks and balances among the three divisions of the federal government
could well result. Therefore, although individual members of Congress-the
Speaker of the House, President pro tempore of the Senate, and the majority
and minority leaders in both houses-have been mentioned as possible com-
mission members to ensure participation by elected representatives in any
decision on presidential inability, this suggestion, too, interjects some un-
wanted features. With the participation of congressional officials a presiden-
tial inability commission would be bound to assume a political appearance.
Individual members of the Congress, though elected by the people, are elected
by the people of a particular small district or state, and are not necessarily
representative of the nation as a whole; only the President and Vice President
are elected by the entire populace.
In keeping with the belief that the initial determination of presidential in-
ability should be kept wholly within the executive branch of the Government,
the Eisenhower plan limited the choice of persons or groups to make the
decision to the Vice President and the Cabinet. This seems a realistic solu-
22. Letter from Chief Justice Earl Warren to Kenneth B. Keating, Jan. 20, 1950:
Supreme Court of the United States,
Hon. Kenneth B. Keating, Washington, D. C., January 20, 1958.
Member of Congress,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Congressman: During the time the subject of inability of a President
to discharge the duties of his office has been under discussion, the members of the
Court have discussed generally, but without reference to any particular bill, the
proposal that a member or members of the Court be included in the membership of
a Commission to determine the fact of Presidential inability to act.
It has been the belief of all of us that because of the separation of powers in our
Government, the nature of the judicial process, the possibility of a controversy of
this character coming to the Court, and the danger of disqualification which might
result in lack of a quorum, it would be inadvisable for any member of the Court to
serve on such a Commission.
I realize that Congress is confronted with a very difficult problem, and if it were
only a matter of personal willingness to serve that anyone in the Government, if
requested to do so, should make himself available for service. However, I do believe
that the reasons above mentioned for nonparticipation of the Court are insurmount-
able.
With best wishes, I am, Sincerely, Earl Warren,
Chief Justice
See also Editorial, Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1958; Krock, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1.958, p.
22, col. 5.
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tion. The Garfield and Wilson precedents indicate strongly that a Vice Presi-
dent, in order to assure wide public support and to eliminate a possible
charge of usurpation, would in fact consult with the Cabinet before making
the momentous decision involved in a declaration that the President is unable
to exercise the powers and duties of the presidency. The Cabinet members
are in a position to know at once whether a President is disabled. Moreover,
the public would accept the Cabinet's opinion as reflecting the views of per-
sons close to the President and alert to any unconstitutional attempt to
deprive him, even temporarily, of his powers.
Under the proposed amendment, two courses of action would be possible.
The Cabinet could notify the Vice President when a majority of its members
believes that the President's inability was sufficient to warrant a devolution
of presidential power to the Vice President. In the past, the Cabinet has
always notified the Vice President when a President has died, and this cus-
tom would thus be extended to the case of inability. The Vice President would
make the decision to assume presidential power, but the constitutional validity
of the decision would depend upon the approval of that decision by a majority
of the Cabinet. Alternatively, the Vice President might take the initiative
without the Cabinet's first inviting him to make the decision; in this case also,
written approval by a majority of the Cabinet would be required before the
Vice President could undertake the exercise of presidential power.
Ultimately, the operation of any constitutional arrangement depends on
public opinion and upon the public's possessing a certain sense of what might
be called "constitutional morality." Absent this feeling of responsibility on
the part of the citizenry, there can be no guarantee against usurpation. No
mechanical or procedural solution will provide a complete answer if one as-
sumes hypothetical cases in which most of the parties are rogues and in which
no popular sense of constitutional propriety exists. The combination of the
judgment of the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet" members ap-
pears to furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the executive, legislative and judicial branches
of the Government.
By way of contrast, the advocates of some specially constituted group to
determine presidential inability face many dilemmas. If the President is so
incapacitated that he cannot declare his own inability, no need exists for a
fact-finding body. Nor is a fact-finding body necessary if the President can
and does declare his inability to exercise the powers of his office at a given
moment. If, however, the President does suffer from an inability which he is
unwilling to admit, and the Vice President and most of the Cabinet and other
government officials are aware of this and believe that the President should
step aside temporarily, then a genuine dispute exists. But this dispute-and
it certainly can become serious-should not be determined by a special com-
mission composed of persons outside the executive. If the controversy is
sharp, the inclusion of political appointees or of officials representing relative-
ly small electorates would give any decision a political complexion. Worse,
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such a commission runs a good chance of coming out with a split decision.
What would be the effect, for example, if a commission of seven voted four
to three that the President was fit and able to perform his office? What
power could he exert during the rest of his term when, by common knowl-
edge, a change of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet deny
him the right to exercise the powers of his office? If, conversely, the vote
were four to three that the President was unable to discharge the functions
of his office, and the Vice President were installed as acting President, what
power could the Vice President exert when everyone would know that one
vote the other way would cause his summary removal from the exercise of
those powers? If the man acting as President were placed in this awkward,
completely untenable and impotent position, the effect on domestic affairs
would be bad enough; the effect on the international position of the United
States might well be catastrophic.
Thus, in the presentation of President Eisenhower's original proposal for
a constitutional amendment in 1957, it was stated that any dispute between
the President and the Vice President regarding termination of the President's
disability could be resolved by Congress's taking impeachment proceedings
against whichever official was wrongfully attempting to exercise the powers
of the presidency. In subsequent public discussion of the proposal, however,
it was pointed out that impeachment and trial are complicated and lengthy
processes, that the Congress is not always in session, and that nothing in the
Constitution now empowers the Vice President to call Congress into special
session. Furthermore, conviction would remove the President permanently,
and the odium attached to impeachment might very well cause many Con-
gressmen to hesitate to take such action--especially against an ill man.
The Revision of Section 4 of the Eisenhower Proposal
In response to criticisms of the impeachment process as a method of re-
solving a dispute between the President and Vice President, Attorney Gen-
eral Rogers on February 18, 1958, presented to the Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Amendment of the Senate Judiciary Committee a revised section 4
for the President's proposal, which now reads:
Section 4. Whenever the President declares in writing that his inability
has terminated, the President shall forthwith discharge the powers and
duties of his office: Provided, however, that if the Vice President and
a majority of the heads of executive departments who are members of
the President's Cabinet shall signify in writing that the President's in-
ability has not terminated, thereupon:
(a) The Congress shall forthwith consider the issue of the President's
inability in accordance with procedures provided for impeachment, and
if the Congress is not in session, shall forthwith convene for this purpose;
(b) If the House of Representatives shall on record vote charge that
the President's inability has not terminated, and the Senate so finds by
the concurrence of two thirds of the members present, the powers and
duties of the office of President shall be discharged by the Vice President
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as Acting President for the remainder of the term, or until Congress by
a majority vote of the members of both Houses determines that the
President's inability has terminated.
2 3
In substance, the revised section 4 provides that if the President under-
takes to resume the exercise of the powers and duties of the presidency, but
has misjudged his condition, the Vice President and a majority of the heads
of the executive departments who are members of the Cabinet may signify
that the President's inability has not terminated, and Congress must step in to
determine the issue. If the Congress is not in session, it would be required
to convene immediately for the purpose of considering the President's inability
under procedures presently established only for impeachment and trial. A
two-thirds vote of the Senate would determine the existence of the President's
inability; a majority vote of both houses would restore the powers of his
office to the President.
In submitting the revision to the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, At-
torney General Rogers pronounced:
Let me stress that the very existence of this ultimate power in Congress
-which is the only power it needs in relation to this question-would
in all probability insure that this extreme situation would never arise.
No Vice President would resist a President reasserting his claim to the
powers of the office unless the President were in fact unable to perform.
No President-in fact unable to perform-would be permitted by his
family and close personal counsellors to reassert his claim and precipitate
an issue likely to be resolved against him by Congress.
24
Public interest in the question of presidential disability, reawakened by the
revision of section 4 greatly increased when, less than a month later, Presi-
dent Eisenhower announced his "understanding" with Vice President Nixon,
a dramatic presentation of the legal problems involved and the Administra-
tion's viewpoint.
THaE EISENIIOWER-NIxoN UNDERSTANDING ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
After the President's heart attack in September 1955, informal discussions
were had between the President and the Vice President concerning what the
Vice President's role should be in the event of a similar unfortunate occurrence,
or any other happening which would disable the President temporarily at a
time when presidential action was required. As a result, at the time of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's ileitis operation in 1956, Vice President Nixon stood by
fully prepared to initiate, as acting President, whatever action would be
necessary in case of international emergency; for it was realized that the
announced intention of the President to undergo a serious operation might
entice a hostile foreign power to make some drastic move in the expectation
23. Statement of Attorney General Rogers on Presidential Inability, app. III, Feb. 18,
1958 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, mimeographed).
24. Id. at 16.
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of finding, at the critical moment, confused and uncertain leadership in the
United States.
On March 3, 1958, a historic step was taken when the President and Vice
President, in consultation with the Attorney General, reduced to memoran-
dum form their understanding of the constitutional role of the Vice President
as acting President. The Eisenhower-Nixon understanding is stated in these
terms:
The President and the Vice President have agreed that the following
procedures are in accord with the purposes and provisions of Article 2,
Section 1, of the Constitution, dealing with Presidential inability. They
believe that these procedures, which are intended to apply to themselves
only, are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution but are con-
sistent with its present provisions and implement its clear intent.
1. In the event of inability the President would-if possible-so in-
form the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as Acting
President, exercising the powers and duties of the office until the in-
ability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the President
from communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President, after
such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances,
would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the Office
and would serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the inability
had ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the powers
and duties of the Office.
2 5
The understanding represents the Eisenhower Administration's interpreta-
tion of the Constitution as it now stands. The only addition to present con-
stitutional requirements is that the Vice President take action "after such
consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances." Although
the Constitution does not require the Vice President to consult anyone, it was
felt that, as a matter of good judgment, the Vice President would want to
consult members of the Cabinet, congressional leaders of both parties, and
perhaps other prominent citizens before presuming to exercise the powers and
duties of the presidency. The Eisenhower-Nixon understanding, in effect,
gives the Vice President the comfort of being directed to seek opinion from
other persons and thus strengthens his position if he should be obliged to take
these steps. Appropriately, in view of constitutional silence on the matter, the
persons with whom the Vice President is to consult are not mentioned. Pre-
sumably, the Vice President's choice would depend on the circumstances of
the moment; in a time of international crisis the opportunity for consultation
might be very brief. On other occasions, the Vice President might find con-
sultation with a large number of people not only feasible but desirable, for,
obviously, the broader the base of opinion, the greater the support would be
for his decision.
25. N.Y. Times, March 4, 1958, p. 1, col. 2, p. 17, col. 1.
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Consistent with the Constitution as it now stands is the agreement's pro-
vision that in cases where the President is unable to notify the Vice President
of his disability the Vice President is sole judge of the necessity for his exer-
cising the powers and duties of chief executive. This is so because the Con-
stitution does not state who should determine the President's inability in the
many circumstances in which, as the founders themselves must have foreseen,
it cannot be the President himself. The Cabinet could not have been intended
to judge the issue, since this body is not referred to in the Constitution. It
is not the Congress, except by the negative sanction of impeachment and con-
viction for a wrongful attempt to exercise power. Nor is it the Supreme
Court, because the question of presidential inability is hardly one which fits
any type of jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution on that tribunal. But
the power to determine the inability of the President rests in the Vice Presi-
dent not simply because the Constitution places it nowhere else. By a well-
known principle of law, whenever any official by law or person by private
contract is designated to perform certain duties on thi happening of certain
contingencies, unless otherwise specified, that person who bears the respon-
sibility for performing the duties must also determine when the contingency
for the exercise of his powers arises. Similarly, under the present Constitu-
tion, it is the President who determines when his inability has terminated and
he is ready once more to execute his office. The Eisenhower-Nixon under-
standing, by providing, first, for the Vice President's determination of presi-
dential inability and, second, for the President's determination of when that
inability terminates, thus coincides perfectly with article II, section 1, of the
Constitution as originally drafted in 1787 and analyzed in this Article.
Although the understanding purports to bind only the present occupants of
the presidency and vice presidency, it may well prove powerfully persuasive
in the future since, as most constitutional authorities now believe, it presents
a very correct interpretation of the Constitution. Still, the Eisenhower-Nixon
memorandum, or anything similar to it, can only operate between two persons
who are in complete agreement about their respective positions. The under-
standing embodies no mechanism, and there is no mechanism in the present
Constitution except the complicated process of impeachment, to resolve a dis-
pute between the President and the Vice President as to the President's
capacity to perform. By its very nature, this question is something that no
agreement between a President and a Vice President alone can resolve. It
is something which has not been settled satisfactorily by the present Con-
stitution. Herein is the great virtue of revised section 4 of President Eisen-
hower's proposed constitutional amendment, under which a dispute between
the President and Vice President on the question of inability would im-
mediately be placed in the hands of Congress.
The Eisenhower-Nixon understanding also does not cover the problem of
the presidential oath. Speaker of the House Rayburn has stated that, in his
opinion, it would be necessary for the Vice President to take a new oath of
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office to serve as acting President.2 6 Mlost authorities, however, would say
that this step is unnecessary since, when the Vice President originally takes
his oath, he swears to perform the duties of the office of Vice President, one
of which-and the one first created by the drafters of the Constitution-is to
act as an alternate chief executive. His other duties are to serve as presiding
officer of the Senate and to vote in the Senate in case of a tie. It seems no
more necessary for the Vice President to take the presidential oath when he
acts as President than it is for him to recite the senatorial oath when, in cast-
ing a decisive vote, he acts as senator. In both instances, he is performing
one of the functions of his own office, that of Vice President, which his
original oath covers. Surely, however, these and more vital questions concern-
ing the very exercise of the presidential power itself should be cleared up
before a time of crisis forces us to resolve the issue. It is precisely in times
of crisis that unquestioned leadership is mandatory. If any question remains
of the Vice President's status as acting President, that issue should be re-
solved by a clear and definite constitutional amendment.
WHY A CONSTITUTIONAL AMIENDMENT IS NEcESSARY
In light of what is now known about the origins of the presidential inability
paragraph, the intent of the framers of the Constitution should be clear to
most people. But one cannot ignore that a division of opinion exists over the
constitutional validity of a temporary devolution of presidential power; nor
can one ignore the precedents established by the Garfield and Wilson cases
and the confusing original interpretation in Tyler's succession, followed in
six subsequent instances. Opinions and precedents, whether well-founded or
not, are operative facts which must be taken into consideration in plotting a
course of action.
It is probable, certainly it is possible, that, in any future crisis concerning
presidential inability, the same conflicts in opinion would arise. History and
logic demonstrate that if a Vice President is to take the momentous step of
assuming the powers of the presidency, even for a specific, temporary period,
he must do so by reason of unquestioned authority. Since the problem here
concerns constitutional powers, questions raised about constitutional powers
and precedents established through the interpretation of constitutional powers,
a statute cannot settle the matter. Ordinary legislation would only throw one
more doubtful element into the picture, for the statute's validity could not
be tested until the occurrence of the presidential inability, the very time at
which uncertainty must be precluded. This defect is especially apparent in
nearly all the statutory proposals advanced on the subject of presidential in-
ability, for they involve a transfer or diminution of the Vice President's con-
stitutional power to determine the existence of presidential inability and to
act in such a contingency. The simple fact is that no mere statute can alter,
transfer or diminish vested constitutional power. Thus, no statute which con-
26. N.Y. Times, March 5, 1958, p. 18, col. 3.
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tained the additional measures needed-a designation of persons to share with
the Vice President the power to make the initial decision, or a provision for
a solution of disputes between the President and Vice President-would alter
the existing powers of the President and Vice President. Even a statute which
sought to do nothing more than declare the original intent of the framers
would have to be construed in the light of previous constitutional interpreta-
tions and the precedents based on those interpretations, and would therefore
be valueless in resolving doubt and uncertainty.
Despite these difficulties, some authorities have urged that Congress can
enact simple legislation under the "necessary and proper" clause of the Con-
stitution. According to the Supreme Court, however, this clause "is not the
delegation of a new and independent power, but simply provision for making
effective the powers theretofore mentioned. ' 7 Since the Constitution confers
no power upon Congress in connection with presidential inability so long as
the Vice President is in office and able to act, congressional action under the
"necessary and proper" clause would seem restricted to the uncommon situa-
tion in which both the President and the Vice President are incapacitated.
As one recognized authority on the subject puts it:
The only power expressly given to Congress to provide for presidential
succession is the power to declare what officer shall act as President
when there is neither a functioning President nor a functioning Vice
President. This would seem to deny congressional power to deal with
inability, because enumeration in the Constitution of certain powers
denies all others unless incident to an expressed power or necessary to
its execution-inclusio unius, exclusio alterius.
28
The records of the Constitutional Convention support this conclusion. Refer-
ence to the parallel texts of paragraph 6 set forth in the first section of this
Article will show that the first clause of paragraph 6, which deals with presi-
dential inability only, never contained a reference to congressional action of
any type whatsoever. Moreover, the first clause was originally drafted and
adopted completely independently of the second portion of paragraph 6, which
permits Congress to act where both the President and Vice President are
unable to function. The history of the paragraph and rules of sound construc-
tion thus combine in an irrefutable negation of congressional power to legis-
late where presidential inability alone is involved.
2 9
A common objection to removing current doubts about presidential inability
by constitutional amendment is that the amendment process is dangerously
slow. History shows, however, that a constitutional amendment can be speed-
ily effected when the objective to be obtained is a popular one, if, of course,
Congress is disposed to act in the first place. The seventeenth amendment,
providing for the election of senators by popular vote, took thirteen and a half
27. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 88 (1907).
28. Silva, Presidential Inability, 35 U. DEr. L.J. 139, 171 (1957).
29. See Butler, Presidential Inability, 133 NORTH AMERICAN REv. 417, 432 (1881).
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months. The twenty-first amendment, repealing the eighteenth (prohibition)
amendment, took less than ten months. Woman's suffrage, the nineteenth
amendment, required only fifteen months, and the twentieth amendment, limit-
ing Presidents to two terms, was ratified in eleven months. These periods may
be compared with the five years it took Congress to enact a new statute
establishing the sequence of presidential succession after the Vice President.
TIlE PROPOSED BIPARTISAN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RELATING TO
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
On the day following the Eisenhower-Nixon announcement, a bipartisan
majority of the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee joined in spon-
soring a proposed constitutional amendment on presidential inability.30 The
text of the proposed amendment reads as follows:
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of
his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President for
the unexpired portion of the then current term.
Section 2. If the President shall declare in writing that he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties
shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
Section 3. If the President does not so declare, the Vice President,
if satisfied that such inability exists, shall, upon the written approval of
a majority of the heads of the executive departments in office, assume the
discharge of the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Section 4. Whenever the President makes public announcement in
writing that his inability has terminated, he shall resume the discharge
of the powers and duties of his office on the seventh day after making
such announcement, or at such earlier time after such announcement as
he and the Vice President may determine. But if the Vice President,
with the written approval of a majority of the heads of executive depart-
ments in office at the time of such announcement, transmits to the Con-
gress his written declaration that in his opinion the President's inability
has not terminated, the Congress shall thereupon consider the issue. If
the Congress is not then in session, it shall assemble in special session
on the call of the Vice President. If the Congress determines by concur-
rent resolution, adopted with the approval of two-thirds of the Members
present in each House, that the inability of the President has not termi-
nated, thereupon, notwithstanding any further announcement by the Pres-
ident, the Vice President shall discharge such powers and duties as Act-
ing President until the occurrence of the earliest of the following events:
(1) the Acting President proclaims that the President's inability has
ended, (2) the Congress determines by concurrent resolution, adopted
with the approval of a majority of the Members present in each House,
that the President's inability has ended, or (3) the President's term ends.
Section 5. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the re-
moval, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice
30. S. Res. 161, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Sponsors included Senators Kefauver,
Dirksen, Hruska, Hennings, Johnston of South Carolina, Langer, Watkins, Jenner and
Butler.
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President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such
officer shall act accordingly until the disability be removed or a President
shall be elected. If at any time there is no Vice President, the powers
and duties conferred by this article upon the Vice President shall devolve
upon the officer eligible to act as President next in line of succession to
the office of President, as provided by law.
The first two sections of this proposal are identical with the constitutional
amendment prepared by President Eisenhower. Section 3, which provides
for the situation in which the President is unable to declare his inability, is
similar to the corresponding Eisenhower proposal. It diminishes the Vice
President's sole power to determine presidential inability, as it exists under
the present Constitution, by requiring that he shall have the written approval
of a majority of the "heads of the executive departments in office." The
phrase "who are members of the President's Cabinet," which appears in the
Eisenhower draft, is omitted in the bipartisan bill, presumably because the
Cabinet is not presently recognized in the Constitution. The "heads of the
executive departments" referred to in both proposals are determined by Con-
gress in section 1 of title 5 of the United States Code; so the substance of
both proposals is probably the same.
Section 4 advances the design of the present Constitution and the Eisen-
hower-Nixon understanding that the President himself determine when his
inability has terminated. As stressed before, all-important in persuading a
President to step aside is the assurance that he will be allowed to return on
his own determination that his inability is ended. The proposed amendment
does not provide, however, for his instantaneous resumption of duty. It stipu-
lates that he resumes the duties of his office "the seventh day after making
such announcement" of the termination of inability. This seven-day provision
is designed to cover the possible situation in which a President, though in
truth unfit to resume his job, is determined to assert his power once again
because of some unfortunate mental delusion or sheer perverseness. The
seven-day requirement affords a period in which a disabled President might
be persuaded by his personal advisers to withdraw his announcement, in which
the Vice President can assay the situation and gauge general public feeling
about the President's capacity, and in which each party can deliberate on the
necessity of precipitating the unfortunate situation of an open conflict before
Congress.
After the measure was introduced by the sponsoring senators, Attorney
General Rogers pointed out that if the President and Vice President were in
complete agreement that the President should resume the powers of his office,
there seemed no good reason why he should not do so immediately. As the
proposed amendment is drafted, the President could not declare in advance
that in seven days from a certain date he would be able to assume his duties.
He must make "public announcement in writing that his inability has termi-
nated"; and it is certainly wise to require that the President not forecast his
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eventual recovery, but certify to the public that he has indeed recovered. But
if the President were prepared to make a present certification and everyone
were in full agreement that he was fully restored to health, the seven-day
delay would be unwarranted. Therefore, the Senate Subcommittee inserted
the words, "or at such earlier time after such announcement as he and the
Vice President may determine," after the seven-day provision in order to
provide for the situation in which no dispute should exist over the President's
capacity.
Section 4 also delineates very precisely the procedure for initiation of the
Vice President's challenge to the President's capacity if grounds for such
challenge exist. To question the President's decision that his inability has
terminated, the Vice President must have the written approval of a majority
of the heads of executive departments in office at the time of the presidential
announcement. This ensures not only that the Vice President will be pre-
cluded from contesting unless he has the backing of a majority of the heads
of the executive departments but that, for the purposes of determining
Cabinet support, the identities of the executive heads will be fixed as of the
time of the President's pronouncement. Hence, a President would be pre-
vented from changing the effect of the Vice President's action by demanding
the resignation of all in the Cabinet not siding with the incumbent chief
executive.
Having secured the necessary endorsement, the Vice President must trans-
mit to Congress his written declaration contesting termination of the Presi-
dent's inability. If Congress were then in session, presumably it would give
immediate consideration to this vital matter. If Congress were not in session,
absent section 4's special provisions, the Vice President's challenge would be
ineffective during a crucial period until the next regular session of Congress,
since presently the Vice President has no power to assemble the Congress in
special session, and a President would be highly unlikely to do so for the
purpose of considering his own inability. The proposed amendment therefore
authorizes the Vice President to call a special session of Congress when
necessary.
For the Vice President to establish his contention and the President to be
temporarily denied the resumption of his duties, the President's inability must
be established by the same margin required for impeachment and conviction
-two thirds of the members present in each house. The issue before the
Congress will not be that of an alleged high crime or misdemeanor, however,
but the issue of the President's inability. If Congress decides that the inability
has not terminated, the Vice President is to serve as acting President until
the occurrence of one of the three specified events, and is to do so "notwith-
standing any further announcement by the President." This phrase was in-
serted to guarantee that a President could make only one announcement of
the termination of his inability; if his judgment is challenged, he must justify
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his position at that time. Thus, once Congress has determined that the Presi-
dent's inability has in fact not terminated, restoration of the President to office
would thenceforth depend not on his own announcement, but on other con-
tingencies.
As stated in the bipartisan proposal, these contingencies are: the acting
President (Vice President) proclaims that the President's inability has ended;
or the Congress determines by a concurrent resolution requiring only a simple
majority of the members present in each house that the inability has ended;
or the President's term ends. Allowing the acting President to proclaim that
the President's inability has ended is consistent with other provisions of the
amendment and with the theory that if the two persons most vitally con-
cerned-the chief executive and his alternate-are in accord, no one else either
inside or outside the executive branch has an interest in the matter. Although
the proposed amendment requires a two-thirds majority to oust the President
temporarily, if a simple majority of the Congress feels that the President's
inability has terminated, it seems only just and proper that he be restored to
the full exercise of his powers.
Section 5 of the bipartisan proposal repeats the present constitutional pro-
vision that Congress may by law provide for the case of the removal, death,
resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, and may
declare what officer shall then act as President until the disability is ended or
a President elected. It then adds a separate sentence providing that "if at any
time there is no Vice President," the functions envisaged for the Vice Presi-
dent by the proposed new constitutional amendment "shall devolve upon the
officer eligible to act as President next in line of succession to the office of
President, as provided by law."
For clarity, this section probably should refer to "no Vice President able
to act as President," since the intent is to cover not only a vacancy in the
vice presidency, but inability as well. Furthermore, except for the Vice Presi-
dent, "the officer [next] eligible to act as President" is not "next in line of
succession to the office of President." He is, under the Constitution and the
Law of Succession, an officer who acts as President, but he never succeeds to
the office. The words "to the office of President" should be omitted from the
proposed amendment.
CONCLUSION
The proposed constitutional amendment sponsored by the bipartisan major-
ity of the Senate Judiciary Committee adopts the basic provisions of the
Eisenhower proposal, adding a more precise definition of the procedures to
be followed in the unlikely event of a dislpute between a President and a Vice
President over the termination of the President's disability. Both proposals
deal with the presidential inability question by constitutional amendment. Both
make abundantly clear that, when the President is disabled, the Vice Presi-
dent takes over the powers and duties of the presidency only as the acting
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President for the period of disability. Both provide that the President may
voluntarily declare his inability and that, if he does not, the initial determina-
tion of fact shall be made within the executive branch-that is, by the Vice
President on the written approval of a majority of the heads of the executive
departments in office. Finally, both the Eisenhower and bipartisan proposals
would allow the President to resume the powers and duties of the presidency
upon his own declaration that he is again able to handle them. Most important,
either proposal would achieve these goals in consonance both with the original
intent of the framers of the Constitution and with the balance of powers which
is the permanent strength of the Constitution.
